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Abstract
This paper studies the differences between fi scal multipliers in OECD economies across the 
credit cycle. Impulse responses are obtained using a state-dependent model with direct 
projections, in which multipliers depend on the state of credit markets. Identifi cation of the 
effects of fi scal stimulus and austerity measures is achieved by distinguishing between 
unanticipated increases and decreases in government spending. The empirical results imply 
that the fi nancial environment matters. Expansionary fi scal policies are associated with large 
multipliers during credit crunch episodes, and spending increases likewise foster economic 
growth in periods of rapid credit expansion, albeit to a lesser extent. In contrast, the output 
effect of contractionary fi scal policies is never statistically different from zero. Regime-specifi c 
multipliers of the individual components of GDP and the unemployment rate suggest that 
reductions in public expenditure should help constrain the economy during unsustainable 
credit booms, whereas spending increases in fi nancial recessions should facilitate the repair 
of private sector balance sheets in order to revive market confi dence and boost economic 
recovery.
Keywords: credit cycle, fi scal multiplier, fi scal policy, government spending, state dependence.
JEL classifi cation: E20, E44, E62, G10.
Resumen
Este trabajo estudia las diferencias entre los multiplicadores fiscales a lo largo del ciclo de 
crédito en las economías de la OCDE. Se obtienen respuestas al impulso mediante un modelo 
estado dependiente con proyecciones directas, en el que los multiplicadores dependen 
del estado de los mercados de crédito. La identificación de los efectos de las medidas de 
estímulo y de austeridad fiscal se logra mediante la distinción entre los incrementos y las 
disminuciones no anticipados en el gasto público. Los resultados empíricos destacan la 
importancia del entorno financiero. Las políticas fiscales expansivas están asociadas con 
grandes multiplicadores durante los episodios de crisis crediticias y, además, un aumento 
del gasto también fomenta el crecimiento económico en los períodos de expansiones 
rápidas de crédito, aunque en menor medida. Por el contrario, el efecto de las políticas 
fiscales contractivas en la producción no es nunca estadísticamente distinto de cero. Los 
multiplicadores para cada componente del PIB y la tasa de desempleo implican que las 
reducciones en el gasto público deben ayudar a restringir la economía durante los auges de 
crédito excesivos, mientras que el aumento de los gastos en las recesiones financieras 
debería facilitar la reparación de los balances del sector privado con el fin de reactivar la 
confianza del mercado e impulsar la recuperación económica.
Palabras clave: ciclo de crédito, multiplicador fiscal, política fiscal, gasto público, 
dependencia de estado.
Códigos JEL: E20, E44, E62, G10.
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1 Introduction
Credit cycles are remarkable for two reasons. On the one hand, episodes of excessive
private borrowing may lead to vulnerabilities in the financial system through looser lend-
ing standards, increased leverage, and systemic risks, which are often followed by severe
economic downturns (Mendoza and Terrones, 2012; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). On the
other, economic crises associated with credit crunches tend to be deeper and more pro-
longed than normal recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Claessens, Kose, and Terrones,
2009; Jorda`, Schularick, and Taylor, 2013). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that
credit cycles have much lower frequency and greater amplitude than the traditional busi-
ness cycles (Aikman, Haldane, and Nelson, 2015). Interestingly, however, these salient
features observed in industrialized economies for over a century now (Kindleberger, 1978;
Schularick and Taylor, 2012) have been largely ignored until the global financial crisis
of 2007-2008. Since then, a rich set of works have documented the role of finance in
shaping macroeconomic dynamics (e.g., Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov, 2012;
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014, and references therein), which poses new chal-
lenges for policymakers going forward.1
A variety of measures have been proposed in recent years to deal with unhealthy
credit booms and subsequent busts, such as more active monetary policy interventions and
macroprudential policy instruments (see, for instance, Adrian and Shin, 2009; Mishkin,
2009; Bank of England, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Borio and Zhu, 2012). Besides,
given that the conventional monetary policies are typically ineffective in liquidity traps
with interest rates at or near zero, fiscal tools have gained increasing attention in the
aftermath of the latest economic crisis.2 Nonetheless, despite the burgeoning of studies
that assess the impact of fiscal policies, the effectiveness of government interventions in
addressing financial imbalances is still subject of much debate (e.g., Corsetti, Kuester,
1 For a detailed discussion of the role and implications of the financial cycle for macroeconomics,
see Borio (2014). From the methodological standpoint, however, a recent article by Gadea Rivas and
Perez-Quiros (2015) emphasizes the limitations of credit in the identification of the economic cycle.
2 Several studies have looked at the quantitative effects of fiscal policies in liquidity traps and find that
government spending multipliers can be substantially large when the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate binds (e.g., Woodford, 2011; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011; Eggertsson and
Krugman, 2012). Against this view, Mertens and Ravn (2014) argue that a government spending stimulus
is relatively ineffective when a liquidity trap is caused by a self-fulfilling state of low consumer confidence.
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Meier, and Mu¨ller, 2010; Mishkin, 2011; Kollmann, Roeger, and in’t Veld, 2012; DeLong
and Summers, 2012; Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). In fact, contrasting viewpoints about
the magnitude of fiscal multipliers ever since the seminal work of Keynes (1936) emphasize
the sensitivity of predictions, owing particularly to the differences in economic conditions
regarding the level of development, exchange rate regime, trade openness, or public in-
debtedness, for instance (see, e.g., Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller, 2012; Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Vegh, 2013; Nickel and Tudyka, 2014).3 In addition, Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s
(2007) and Aghion, He´mous, and Kharroubi (2014) show that the expansionary effects
of positive fiscal shocks increase with the share of liquidity-constrained households and
industries in the economy. There is thus reason to believe that the size of fiscal multi-
pliers depends critically on the state of credit markets, and failure to recognize that may
undermine the power of public policy decisions.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to offer important implications
for the design of optimal fiscal policies, by analyzing the macroeconomic effects of changes
in government spending across the credit cycle. In this regard, the paper also contributes
to a growing literature that employs non-linear models to study the impact of fiscal policy
in economic expansions and recessions, including Bachmann and Sims (2012), Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Candelon and Lieb
(2013), Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), and Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin
(2015).
Based on the conjecture that the effect of government spending varies according to
the financial environment, state-dependent impulse responses are calculated for a panel of
OECD countries using the local projections method advocated by Jorda` (2005), where the
size of the multiplier depends on the credit regime, being expansionary or contractionary.
Specifically, fiscal multipliers are evaluated under the most extreme financial conditions,
that is, during episodes of rapid credit booms and severe credit crunches. Unanticipated
innovations in public expenditure are identified using forecast errors of the OECD gov-
ernment spending projections. Moreover, by distinguishing between positive and negative
shocks – i.e., increases and decreases in government spending –, the non-linear approach
3 Existing studies provide a a range of estimates of the government spending multiplier from less than
0 to well over 3, depending on the identifying assumptions and the state of the economy, among other
factors. For critical surveys of the literature on fiscal multipliers, see Hall (2009) and Ramey (2011a).
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enables to gauge the economies’ true response to procyclical and countercyclical fiscal be-
havior in different credit regimes.4 Finally, the exploration of the responses of the different
components of GDP and the unemployment rate sheds further light on the strength of
fiscal policies in curbing the adverse effects of the credit cycle, and the channels through
which they propagate to the real economy. Insights into the underlying transmission
mechanisms should help frame fiscal policy decisions in order to tame the overheating in
the economy during excessive credit booms, and reverse the downward spiral of aggregate
demand when the bust comes.
The findings of the empirical analysis establish the importance of the state of credit
markets in predicting the extent to which fiscal intervention can be effective in indus-
trialized economies. Three main results emerge. First, regime-specific impulse responses
display a strong and statistically significant reaction of real GDP to fiscal policy shocks
on average during episodes of severe credit contractions. On the contrary, when credit
growth is excessive, the mean response of output to a change in government spending
is close to zero, and not significant in statistical terms. Second, distinguishing between
increases and decreases in public expenditure reveals that countercyclical fiscal stance
is desirable both when credit markets are dysfunctional, and when there is a surge in
private borrowing. In fact, fiscal austerity measures have essentially no impact on real
GDP across the credit cycle. However, even though positive government spending shocks
could stimulate the economy in periods of large credit expansions, consolidation during
the boom years can help create fiscal space to stabilize the financial sector and boost eco-
nomic recovery when credit markets collapse. Therefore, commitment to fiscal discipline
in the expansionary regime can facilitate macroeconomic stability in the long run at a rel-
atively low cost. Third, multipliers of private consumption, net exports, unemployment,
and the weak response of private investment during credit crunches in particular suggest
that fiscal policies could be more efficient if government spending would be targeted di-
rectly to repair and strengthen the private balance sheets. Fixing the financial system by
reestablishing the flow of credit to the economy would in turn revive market confidence,
crowd in more private investment, and restore economic growth. The contractionary fiscal
4 Throughout the analysis, procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy refers to changes in government
spending that are positively (negatively) correlated with the state of the credit cycle.
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policy measures and subsequent stagnation observed in Europe following the latest finan-
cial crisis lend further support to these findings, indicating that austerity in financially
depressed economies is less of a cure than previously thought.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a brief description
of the data and describes the methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results.
Section 4 considers the broader implications of the main findings, and finally concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
The study makes use of a comprehensive dataset including 24 OECD economies over
the period 1985-2012.5 Data for real GDP, real government spending, real private con-
sumption, real private investment, real net exports, consumer price index, and the un-
employment rate come from the OECD’s Statistics and Projections database. In line
with the related literature, government spending refers to the sum of public consumption
expenditure and government gross capital formation. Fiscal policy shocks are identified
using government spending forecast errors constructed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013).6 Specifically, unanticipated changes in public spending are computed as the dif-
ference between actual, first-release series of the government spending growth rate and
the forecast series prepared by professional OECD forecasters. This novel approach using
government spending forecast errors provides a preferable alternative to the standard VAR
shocks, which – as argued in Ramey (2011b) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013)
– are predicted by professional forecasters to a significant degree.7 Since the OECD’s
forecasts are available only in June and December of each year, all data have been con-
verted to semiannual frequency. Series of credit to the non-financial private sector by
domestic banks is obtained from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) database.
5Data are consistently available for 24 out of the 35 OECD member states. These countries are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6 The sample for government spending forecast errors ends in 2008.
7 For a thorough discussion on the conveniences of employing forecast errors based on OECD projec-
tions, see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013).
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Private credit is deflated by the consumer price index, and all variables except for the
unemployment rate are in logs.
2.2 Methodological framework
Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), regime-specific impulse response func-
tions are estimated with the local projections method introduced by Jorda` (2005). The
main advantage of using direct projections is that it conveniently accommodates state
dependence without imposing any dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs, for
instance. Since it does not constrain the shape of the impulse responses, the estimation
is more robust to misspecification errors. This single-equation approach only requires the
estimation of a collection of regressions for each horizon and variable of interest. In partic-
ular, impulse response functions are obtained here by directly projecting output, private
consumption, private investment, net exports, or the unemployment rate on its lags and
on the lags of government spending. Potential heteroskedasticity and error correlation
problems across countries and time are addressed by using White-robust standard errors.
As discussed in Ramey (2012), despite the advantages of estimating non-linear multipliers
using local projections, the Jorda` method tends to induce statistically significant oscilla-
tions at larger horizons. Even so, impulse responses are computed for only 6 horizons,
i.e., three years, throughout the paper, therefore the estimation results are not likely to
be affected by this methodological concern.
The baseline specification to calculate non-linear government spending multipliers for
GDP (Yi,t) – or any other macroeconomic variable – at the horizon h is given by the
following fixed effects panel data model:
Yi,t+h = αi,h + I(θi,t−1)βC,hFEGi,t + (1− I(θi,t−1))βE,hFEGi,t
+I(θi,t−1)ΨC,h(L)Yi,t−1 + (1− I(θi,t−1))ΨE,h(L)Yi,t−1
+I(θi,t−1)ΩC,h(L)Gi,t−1 + (1− I(θi,t−1))ΩE,h(L)Gi,t−1 + i,t,h, (1)
with
I(θi,t) =
e−γθi,t
1 + e−γθi,t
, γ > 0,
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where the subscripts i and t index countries and time, αi captures country fixed effects,
Gi,t refers to government spending, and FE
G
i,t is the government spending forecast error
based on the projections prepared by professional forecasters at time t − 1 for period
t. The treatment FEGi,t may be understood as a series of unanticipated innovations in
public expenditure, and the essential coefficients {βC,h}Hh=0 and {βE,h}Hh=0 measure the
average response of output to a government spending shock during credit contractions
and expansions, respectively.8 Note that the dynamic impact of a shock is obtained from
separate regressions for each horizon h = 1, 2, ..., H. Unlike in standard VAR models, the
lag polynomials only enter as controls in Equation 1, and they are not used to compute the
dynamics. Ψ(L) and Ω(L) correspond to lag operator polynomials of order 4, to control
for the history of government spending shocks. I(θi,t) is a smooth transition function
that varies between 0 and 1 depending on the credit regime of the economy, and can be
interpreted as the probability of being in a credit contraction, given θi,t. The variable θi,t
measures the state of the credit cycle in country i at time t, based on the deviation of the
6-quarter moving average of the growth rate of private credit from its trend, normalized
to have zero mean and unit variance.9, 10 The trend is extracted using the Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) filter, with the smoothing parameter set to 10,000.11 Consistent with
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), a credit contraction is defined here as a period in
which I(θi,t) is greater than 0.8, and the curvature parameter γ is calibrated to match
the average frequency of credit contractions observed in the sample.12, 13 Specifically, γ =
1.7 so that a typical OECD economy in the panel spends about 23% of the time in a
contractionary regime. Throughout the analysis, government spending multipliers are
estimated for the most severe credit crunches (i.e., I(·) ≈ 1) and largest credit booms
8 The corresponding linear multiplier can be easily obtained when the impulse responses in Equation 1
are restricted to be identical across the different states of the credit cycle, i.e., βC,h = βE,h for all h.
9One-period lag of θi,t is considered to minimize the contemporaneous correlation between government
spending shocks and the variation in private credit.
10While the results are largely robust to using the credit/GDP ratio to define the credit regime,
considering the rate of real credit growth allows to capture the direct role of private credit flow as a
source of financial instability.
11 The very high smoothing parameter ensures that the filter removes even the lowest frequency varia-
tions in the private credit series (see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) for details).
12Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) define economic recessions as periods in which I(·) > 0.8.
13 The fraction of credit contractions in the sample is calculated by employing the Bry and Boschan
(1971) dating algorithm, where the duration of a contractionary phase is given by the number of periods
between a credit peak and the subsequent trough.
(i.e., 1− I(·) ≈ 1).
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The key contribution of the paper to the emerging literature on non-linear govern-
ment spending multipliers is to analyze how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies
depend on the evolution of private credit. As argued before, focusing solely on the state
of the business cycle may be misleading under extreme financial conditions. In support
of this claim, the most recent crisis made it abundantly clear that business fluctuations
cannot be looked at in isolation from developments in financial markets. In particular,
financial frictions give rise to credit cycles distinct from the business cycle, characterized
by lower frequency and larger amplitude (Aikman et al., 2015). Ignoring these differences
can lead to erroneous policy responses, especially because policymakers tend to overlook
that a credit cycle has a longer duration than a business cycle. In the context of finan-
cial downturns, Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012) refer to this phenomenon as
”unfinished recessions”. Figure 1 shows for selected OECD countries that the smooth
transition function in Equation 1 performs well in capturing the disparities between the
cyclical dynamics of private credit and output. Note that the state of the business cycle
is determined in a similar manner as for the credit cycle, with the weight given by the
growth rate of real GDP.14 Some of the most striking examples of ”unfinished recessions”
include the financial crisis in the Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden) in the early
1990s, the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S., the Mexican peso
crisis that erupted in December 1994, and the most recent financial recession in Spain.
While the baseline specification takes account of the differences across regimes, Riera-
Crichton et al. (2015) demonstrate that ignoring whether government spending is going
up or down during economic recessions and expansions yields biased estimates of the fis-
cal multiplier. They show that the problem originates in the fact that output does not
respond symmetrically to increases or decreases in government spending, when distin-
guishing between procyclical and countercyclical fiscal behavior. Regarding the sample
considered, in as much as 50% of the cases government spending is procyclical, i.e., gov-
ernment spending is going up in credit booms and going down in credit busts. Thus,
in order to avoid the introduction of potential bias, Equation 1 is modified to estimate
14As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), γ = 1.5 is fixed so that a typical economy spends about
20% of the time in a recessionary regime, which is consistent with the duration of recessions in the U.S.
identified by the NBER.
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Figure 1: Transition dynamics across regimes of GDP growth and private credit growth
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Note: The figures show the dynamics of smooth transition functions I(θi,t) for selected OECD countries
between 1985-2012. The weights on recession regimes and contraction regimes are given by the growth
rates of real GDP (black lines) and real private credit (gray lines), respectively.
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the effects of unanticipated increases (FEGPOSi,t > 0) and decreases (FE
GNEG
i,t < 0) in
government spending during credit contractions and expansions separately:
Yi,t+h = αi,h + I(θi,t−1)βPOSC,h FE
GPOS
i,t + (1− I(θi,t−1))βPOSE,h FEGPOSi,t
+I(θi,t−1)βNEGC,h FE
GNEG
i,t + (1− I(θi,t−1))βNEGE,h FEGNEGi,t
+I(θi,t−1)ΨPOSC,h (L)Y
POS
i,t−1 + (1− I(θi,t−1))ΨPOSE,h (L)Y POSi,t−1
+I(θi,t−1)ΨNEGC,h (L)Y
NEG
i,t−1 + (1− I(θi,t−1))ΨNEGE,h (L)Y NEGi,t−1
+I(θi,t−1)ΩPOSC,h (L)G
POS
i,t−1 + (1− I(θi,t−1))ΩPOSE,h (L)GPOSi,t−1
+I(θi,t−1)ΩNEGC,h (L)G
NEG
i,t−1 + (1− I(θi,t−1))ΩNEGE,h (L)GNEGi,t−1 + i,t,h, (2)
where Y POSi,t−1 = Yi,t−1 and G
POS
i,t−1 = Gi,t−1 if FE
G
i,t = FE
GPOS
i,t , and zero otherwise, and
similarly, Y NEGi,t−1 = Yi,t−1 and G
NEG
i,t−1 = Gi,t−1 if FE
G
i,t = FE
GNEG
i,t , and zero otherwise.
3 Estimation results
This section first presents impulse responses of real GDP to a 1 percent change in gov-
ernment spending for each of the above model specifications.15 In what follows, responses
are estimated for the major components of output as well as for the unemployment rate,
to get a grasp of the potential mechanisms in different credit regimes that could explain
the results. The responses are scaled to ensure that a shock in FEGi,t changes government
spending by unity. In addition, 90 percent confidence bands associated with the impulse
response functions are computed using the standard errors of the estimated coefficients
of interest.16
3.1 Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions
Based on Equation 1, the cumulated response of output is computed for 3 years following
an unanticipated 1 percent government spending shock during credit crunches and credit
booms (Figure 2). The first result that emerges is that the response of real GDP in severe
15Results are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects, not reported here to save space.
16Distinguishing between unanticipated increases and decreases in government spending during credit
expansions and contractions yields a comparatively small number of observations, therefore, 80 percent
confidence intervals are considered along the impulse responses when using Specification 2.
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Figure 2: Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions: real GDP
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Note: Thick black lines represent the average cumulated response of real GDP to a government spending
shock in (a) credit contractions and (b) credit expansions. Thin gray lines indicate the estimates of the
linear multiplier. Shaded regions and dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence bands of the impulse
response functions for the linear and non-linear specifications, respectively. Horizons are considered at
the semiannual frequency.
credit contractions is positive on impact, and statistically significant for the next 3 periods,
whereas the response in strong credit expansions is not significantly different from zero
at any horizon considered. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), percentage
changes are converted into dollar changes by multiplying the estimated impulse responses
by the sample-period U.S. mean ratio of GDP to government purchases (≈ 5.12). The
resulting fiscal multiplier in contractionary regimes reaches a maximum of 3.67 after 4
semesters, and the mean response over three years is about 2.69. In sharp contrast, the
average multiplier in credit expansions is only 0.03, and never statistically significant.
Both subfigures in Figure 2 additionally report the impulse responses obtained from the
linear specification of the baseline model, i.e., by ignoring the distinction between credit
contractions and expansions. The average linear multiplier over three years is slightly
above one – when using the ratio of real GDP to government spending in the U.S. as
before –, but responses are significant only in the first two years. For the next two periods,
responses remain positive, but not significant in statistical terms. This is consistent with
the previous literature on single government spending multipliers, exemplified by the work
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Nonetheless, since OECD economies spend on average
about 77% of the time in an expansionary regime and 23% of the time in contractions, the
estimates of the linear model are likely to be driven by the muted effect of fiscal shocks in
credit booms, substantially understating the impact in contractions, yet, overestimating
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it in expansions. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate between the states of the credit
cycle in order to identify the true size of the corresponding government spending multiplier
instead of evaluating the average effect across different regimes.
It is difficult to situate the results reported here amidst the long-running public policy
debate on spending multipliers due to the lack of empirical attempts using panel estima-
tion techniques to study the effects of fiscal shocks over the credit cycle. Nevertheless,
the current work is still comparable to a handful of articles that estimate non-linear fis-
cal multipliers under special financial conditions. For instance, Ferraresi, Roventini, and
Fagiolo (2015) employ a threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) model using the BAA
spread as a proxy for credit market conditions in the U.S., and show that fiscal multipliers
are significantly larger in the tight credit regime. Specifically, they find that the multiplier
is 2.26 on impact, reaching 4.16 after five quarters, whereas the spending multiplier in
the normal credit regime is never greater than one. In line with Ferraresi et al. (2015),
a novel study on the Spanish economy by Herna´ndez de Cos and Moral-Benito (2016)
estimates fiscal multipliers to be markedly greater during banking stress episodes. They
consider a smooth transition vector autoregression (STVAR) approach as in Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) to identify the impact of spending shocks during periods of
banking stress versus tranquil times, and report a peak multiplier of 2.27 under the credit
stress regime and responses below one in normal episodes. On a related theme, Corsetti
et al. (2012) find for a panel of OECD countries that output rises about twice as much as
the initial increase in government spending in times of financial crises. In addition, using
nearly identical data, two recent papers on state-dependent multipliers based on local
projections and fiscal shocks identified by government spending forecast errors obtain sig-
nificantly stronger responses during economic downturns. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013) find that the average spending multiplier over three years is about 2.3 in recessions
and is not significantly different from zero in expansions. Similarly, Riera-Crichton et al.
(2015) conclude that the long-run multiplier reaches 2.08 in extreme recessions and is
close to zero during large economic booms. Qualitatively speaking, a general picture that
emerges from the non-linear effects of government spending shocks is that fiscal multipli-
ers tend to be much greater in ’bad times’ than in ’good times’, irrespective of how the
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1618
dichotomies, i..e, expansions and contractions, are defined.17
The findings of this subsection pose new challenges to policymakers. It seems that
the fiscal policies’ effectiveness depends largely on the credit regime. Moreover, while
there exist considerable differences between business cycle fluctuations and the cyclical
dynamics of private credit (see Figure 1), the size of fiscal multipliers in severe credit
crunches and rapid credit booms are highly comparable to those obtained for periods of
deep economic recessions and large expansions. This calls for significant adjustments to
macroeconomic policies, by incorporating the empirical realities of the credit cycle.
3.2 State-dependent multipliers when government spending in-
creases and decreases
There has been no distinction made between fiscal stimuli and fiscal adjustments up to
this point, thus, asymmetric responses to increases and decreases in government spending
are explored next. To this end, fiscal multipliers are estimated using Specification 2, where
positive and negative values of the forecast error indicate whether government spending
goes up (FEGi,t > 0) or down (FE
G
i,t < 0) during credit contractions and expansions. As
forecast errors are positive about 49% of the time and negative 51% of the time in the
sample, interacting this new dimension with the state of the credit cycle yields fairly robust
and comparable estimates. In addition, distinguishing between the resulting scenarios
enables to evaluate the size of procyclical (contraction and FEGi,t < 0, or expansion and
FEGi,t > 0) versus countercyclical (contraction and FE
G
i,t > 0, or expansion and FE
G
i,t < 0)
fiscal multipliers for the sample of OECD economies.18
Cumulative government spending responses for each of the four possible cases are il-
lustrated in Figure 3. By comparing the estimates to the ones obtained in Section 3.1,
several differences become apparent. Most importantly, averaging across public spend-
ing in credit contractions produces a large downward bias in the estimated response to
17Owyang et al. (2013) is an important exception that investigates this proposition using historical
data for the United States and Canada. They find no evidence that multipliers are higher during periods
of slack in the United States, whereas in Canada multipliers are substantially higher during times of slack
in the economy.
18 Positive (negative) values of the point estimates of the impulse responses following an unanticipated
decrease in government spending (FEGi,t < 0) correspond to a decrease (increase) in the dependent
variable.
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Figure 3: Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions, associated with in-
creases and decreases in government spending: real GDP
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Note: Solid black lines represent the average cumulated response of real GDP to a government spending
shock (FEGi,t) in the following cases: (a) credit contraction and increase in government spending, (b)
credit contraction and decrease in government spending, (c) credit expansion and increase in government
spending, (d) credit expansion and decrease in government spending. Dashed lines correspond to 80%
confidence bands. Horizons are considered at the semiannual frequency.
a countercyclical fiscal policy. The true size of the multiplier associated with contrac-
tions following an unanticipated 1 dollar increase in government spending is about 3.41
over three years, and reaches a peak of 5.77 after three semesters (Figure 3/(a)).19 On
average, this is about 30% greater than the magnitude of the response when ignoring
whether government spending increases or decreases during a contractionary episode (see
Figure 2/(a)). In contrast, Figure 3/(b) shows that the procyclical spending multiplier
associated with credit crunches is remarkably different. The contemporaneous response
of output to a decrease in government spending is about 1.45 and marginally significant,
but the responses turn negative, although not statistically different from zero in all subse-
19Note that this exceptionally large fiscal multiplier applies to very severe credit contractions, such as
the ones experienced in many OECD countries during the recent global financial crisis. Consistent with
related studies, the focus of the paper is to evaluate the size of government spending multipliers under
the most extreme conditions, that is, under deep credit crunches and very large credit expansions.
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quent periods. In sum, these estimates imply that by distinguishing between increases and
reductions in government spending in times when credit markets are exceedingly tight,
a countercyclical fiscal policy would substantially boost economic performance, whereas
austerity packages would have virtually no impact on real GDP.
The output effects of government spending shocks in credit booms are not as unam-
biguous. Recall that the size of the multiplier in expansions following an unanticipated
change in government spending is close to zero – and even negative at some horizons –,
and not statistically significant (see Figure 2/(b)). It appears that this is not always the
case, when taking account of the differential impact of fiscal stimuli and fiscal adjustments.
In fact, the response to a procyclical fiscal stance is positive, and borderline significant
on impact, and it does breach statistical significance after two years (Figure 3/(c)). The
three-year average multiplier is about 2.35. The response of output in the expansionary
regime to a countercyclical fiscal policy is relatively weaker (see Figure 3/(d)). The im-
pact multiplier is -0.62, and the response is nearly -1 on average over three years, but
generally one cannot reject the null that the response is zero for any horizon. Hence,
when not considering the statistically non-significance observed for most of the estimates
associated with credit expansions, it seems that irrespective of the fiscal stance, a change
in government spending could potentially stimulate output. In other words, during large
run-ups in private credit markets, a one-dollar spending cut as well as a dollar increase
would raise output in the next three years, by about 1 dollar and 2.35 dollars on average,
respectively. Given that excessive private borrowing often leads to financial and economic
dislocations, however, a countercyclical fiscal behavior may be more rewarding in the long
run, as it would both help constrain the boom and improve the fiscal space by reducing
the debt-to-GDP ratio.
The empirical findings presented so far suggest that policymakers should focus on
building up buffers during large credit expansions and make use of them in times of
severe credit crunches to stabilize the economy. Nevertheless, the main results raise
important questions about the underlying propagation mechanisms. Although a formal
investigation of the potential transmission channels is beyond the scope of this paper, the
following subsection aims to provide a better understanding of how fiscal shocks could
affect economic activity across the credit cycle.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1618
3.3 Disentangling the fiscal policy effects in credit contractions
and expansions
It is now clear that the size of the fiscal multiplier differs according to the state of credit
markets. In what follows, analyzing the behavior of the key components of aggregate
output and unemployment helps to uncover some further insights on the empirical re-
lationship between government spending shocks and the real economy. To this effect,
Equation 2 is re-estimated using private consumption, private investment, net exports,
and the unemployment rate as the dependent variable (Yi,t). Figures 4 to 7 present the re-
spective impulse responses to increases and decreases in public expenditure during severe
credit contractions and large credit expansions.
The first thing to notice is that private consumption is the main channel through
which an expansionary fiscal policy affects economic growth in times of financial distress
(see Figure 3/(a) and Figure 4/(a)). When taking the ratio of private consumption to
government purchases for the United States (≈ 3.5), the average size of the multiplier is
about 4.52. This is evocative of the idea that during severe credit contractions liquidity
constraints are binding, and therefore private consumption is more sensitive to positive
income variations. For further insights on consumption multipliers when households are
financially constrained, see, for instance, Gal´ı et al. (2007). Figure 5/(a) reveals that the
impact on private investment is much weaker. The contemporaneous response is close to
zero, but it becomes positive and marginally significant at some horizons. The average
multiplier over three years is about 1.10, and peaks at a maximum of 1.97 after 4 semesters
when using the ratio of private investment to government spending in the United States
(≈ 0.8). In addition, Figure 7/(a) shows that when credit dries up, a debt-financed
expansionary fiscal policy proves to be successful in reducing unemployment, shrinking
it by as much as 0.5 percent. Note, finally, that in line with conventional wisdom, the
positive spending shock prompts real appreciation and thus deteriorates the trade balance
significantly (Figure 6/(a)).
Recall that the spending multipliers are evaluated here under very tight financial con-
ditions, typically accompanied by deep economic recessions. The estimated responses
corresponding to such extreme events thereby indicate that fiscal expansion can be a
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Figure 4: Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions, associated with in-
creases and decreases in government spending: Private consumption
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Note: Solid black lines represent the average cumulated response of real private consumption to a gov-
ernment spending shock (FEGi,t) in the following cases: (a) credit contraction and increase in government
spending, (b) credit contraction and decrease in government spending, (c) credit expansion and increase
in government spending, (d) credit expansion and decrease in government spending. Dashed lines corre-
spond to 80% confidence bands. Horizons are considered at the semiannual frequency.
powerful tool to stimulate output, as an increase in government expenditure crowds in
private demand (private consumption in particular), moreover, it also contributes to job
creation. The small and borderline significant effect observed for private investment can
be explained by the binding liquidity constraints during severe credit downturns. When
credit markets are extremely tight, given the shortfall of available financial resources, in-
vestor confidence and activity cannot be completely restored. It appears that debtors can
simply not spend more if their creditors insist they cut back. As a comparison, Riera-
Crichton et al. (2015) find evidence in a similar framework that a countercyclical fiscal
policy during economic recessions triggers sizable and persistent increases in private in-
vestment. Thus, fiscal policy tends to be less effective in balance sheet recessions than
in normal recessions, since heavily indebted agents are likely to prioritize the repayment
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Figure 5: Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions, associated with in-
creases and decreases in government spending: Private investment
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Note: Solid black lines represent the average cumulated response of real private investment to a govern-
ment spending shock (FEGi,t) in the following cases: (a) credit contraction and increase in government
spending, (b) credit contraction and decrease in government spending, (c) credit expansion and increase
in government spending, (d) credit expansion and decrease in government spending. Dashed lines corre-
spond to 80% confidence bands. Horizons are considered at the semiannual frequency.
of their debt over additional spending on investment. These results also underline the
importance of the allocation of government spending for economic recovery in the after-
math of a financial meltdown. For instance, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Borio
(2014) argue that offsetting an economic downturn from private debt overhang can only
be successful if fiscal stimulus addresses financial imbalances via debt relief first.
The multiplier of private consumption associated with spending decreases in credit
crunches (Figure 4/(b)) likewise closely resembles the response of output to a procycli-
cal fiscal policy in a contractionary regime (Figure 3/(b)). While consumption initially
suffers, with an impact multiplier nearly one and marginally significant, it gradually de-
creases and becomes insignificant. By the third year, impulse responses turn negative
(i.e., private consumption starts to increase) and borderline significant. Simultaneously,
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Figure 6: Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions, associated with in-
creases and decreases in government spending: Net exports
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Note: Solid black lines represent the average cumulated response of real net exports to a government
spending shock (FEGi,t) in the following cases: (a) credit contraction and increase in government spending,
(b) credit contraction and decrease in government spending, (c) credit expansion and increase in govern-
ment spending, (d) credit expansion and decrease in government spending. Dashed lines correspond to
80% confidence bands. Horizons are considered at the semiannual frequency.
net exports increase slightly on impact, but then decrease over time (Figure 6/(b)). A
possible explanation for such patterns is that fiscal adjustments during credit contrac-
tions trigger a short-lived currency depreciation, coupled with an immediate increase in
the rate of unemployment (Figure 7/(b)) and a fall in private consumption. Still, a decline
in public spending may also cause price levels to go down, having some positive effects
on aggregate demand in the medium run. The average multiplier of private investment
following a spending decrease in credit contractions is only about -1 over three years,
but one cannot reject the null that responses are zero for most horizons (Figure 5/(b)).
Hence, if a procyclical fiscal policy has any effect on economic growth in periods when
credit markets are dysfunctional, it propagates by and large through private consumption.
In contrast, the response of output to a positive fiscal shock in an expansionary credit
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1618
Figure 7: Fiscal multipliers in credit contractions and expansions, associated with in-
creases and decreases in government spending: Unemployment rate
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Note: Solid black lines represent the average cumulated response of the unemployment rate to a gov-
ernment spending shock (FEGi,t) in the following cases: (a) credit contraction and increase in government
spending, (b) credit contraction and decrease in government spending, (c) credit expansion and increase
in government spending, (d) credit expansion and decrease in government spending. Dashed lines corre-
spond to 80% confidence bands. Horizons are considered at the semiannual frequency.
regime is more correlated with private investment. The significant increase in real GDP
about 2.5 years after a rise in government expenditure reflects the run-up in investment
activity (Figure 5/(c)), accompanied by an approximately 0.5 percent fall in unemploy-
ment (Figure 7/(c)). The responses are statistically significant at the longer horizon,
and an additional dollar of government spending crowds in up to 3.75 dollars of private
investment by the third year. At the same time, private consumption and net exports
remain largely unchanged, on average, in response to spending increases during credit
expansions (see Figure 4/(c) and Figure 6/(c)). These findings raise important concerns
about procyclical fiscal policies in times of rapid credit growth, as an increase in gov-
ernment spending may lead to further financial deepening, i.e., excessive borrowing and
speculative investment activities, which often end in devastating financial crises. It is
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also worth noting here that Riera-Crichton et al. (2015) finds no effect on investment –
and output – during extreme economic expansions, which is more consistent with simple
Keynesian models under situations of full employment.
Finally, the effects of a countercyclical fiscal policy in credit booms are somewhat
puzzling. Even though not significant in the statistical sense, a reduction in government
spending in an expansionary regime increases output (Figure 3/(d)). Such stimulatory
effects are not apparent, however, in the response of private demand. On the contrary,
Figure 5/(d) shows that a one-dollar spending cut decreases private investment by about
1.75 dollars on impact, and the responses are significantly different from zero in the first
two semesters. The decline in investment is followed by a fall in private consumption
(Figure 4/(d)) and an increase in the unemployment rate (Figure 7/(d)), with variations
breaching statistical significance by the last semester. Notwithstanding these adverse
effects, a decrease in government spending causes currency depreciation and therefore
increases net exports (Figure 6/(d)), resulting in a muted, yet positive aggregate output
response. Thus, engaging in fiscal consolidation and conducting countercyclical fiscal
policy in times of large credit expansions may help reduce the potential vulnerabilities
associated with excessive debt accumulation at a relatively low cost.
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
The results presented in this paper do not always fall in line with the findings of the
literature on fiscal multipliers. Yet, this empirical fact emerges only when distinguishing
between government spending increases and decreases along the credit cycle. The tra-
ditional Keynesian thinking as well as a number of more recent works (e.g., Bachmann
and Sims, 2012; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2013) argue that fiscal policy is
more effective in times of economic recessions, with increases in government expenditure
crowding in private demand. In addition, Bachmann and Sims (2012) emphasize the
role of confidence in the propagation mechanism, according to which government spend-
ing shocks during recessions are particularly geared toward investment, which in turn
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stimulates productivity in the private sector and output.20 While the neoclassical and
standard New Keynesian models imply that government purchases tend to crowd out pri-
vate expenditure, more recent variants of dynamic general equilibrium models extended
with rule-of-thumb consumers (Gal´ı et al., 2007), binding zero lower bound episodes (e.g.,
Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011), and costly financial intermediation (Canzoneri,
Collard, Dellas, and Diba, 2015) are consistent with existing evidence on the expansionary
effects of government spending.21
In some respects, the non-linear effects of fiscal shocks across the credit cycle diverge
from the conventional wisdoms. The two most notable differences are i) the feeble re-
sponse of private investment, as opposed to the unusually strong positive reaction of
private consumption, to a countercyclical fiscal policy during severe credit contractions,
and ii) the crowding-in effect of a procyclical fiscal policy on private investment in times
of excessive credit booms. The first result suggests that whenever credit frictions are
pervasive, an expansionary fiscal policy can be very successful in offsetting the collapse in
private consumption. However, unlike the predictions of Keynesian theory for economic
recessions, traditional fiscal stimulus itself is not powerful enough to stabilize credit mar-
kets and revive investor confidence and activity in periods of financial turmoil, when
liquidity constraints are binding. Corsetti et al. (2012) derive a similar prediction by esti-
mating the effects of government spending shocks during financial crises, i.e., in economic
recessions when access to credit is severely restricted. Regarding the second discrepancy,
it seems that a positive innovation in public spending is compatible with an increase
in private investment and growth, even during large expansions.22 Intuitively, a reason
for such crowding-in effect is that during a credit frenzy bank lending standards are ex-
tremely loose, thereby investment in the private sector is less affected by an increase in
interest rates caused by a surge in government spending. Hence, when financial markets
become overly turbulent, the complementary effect supported by the Keynesian view un-
der recessionary regimes is likely to prevail over the crowding-out effect advocated by the
20 For an early contribution on the complementary effect between public investment and private sector
productivity, see Aschauer (1989).
21 The underlying crowding-out mechanisms are described in detail in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Baxter and King (1993), Fata´s and Mihov (2001), and Linnemann and Schabert (2003), among
others.
22 Empirical evidence suggests that rapid credit booms are typically associated with periods of strong
economic expansion (see, e.g., Mendoza and Terrones, 2012).
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neoclassical theory, and a rise in public expenditure can lead to further increases in private
investment. Interestingly, private consumption remains largely unchanged in response to
a procyclical fiscal policy during rapid credit expansions, which again points to the rather
speculative nature of private investment in such episodes.
The findings of the paper suggest that the financial environment at the time the
government expenditure becomes effective matters. Successful policy packages should
therefore take account of credit market dynamics besides the phases of a typical business
cycle to achieve the desired effect. Above all, since deficit-financed government spending
may reduce the ability to cope with deep and long-lasting financial recessions, fiscal con-
solidation should take place during economic expansions associated with credit booms,
and public reserves should be used to relieve private debt burdens and restore aggregate
demand in times of severe credit crunches. In this way, anchors in the fiscal regime can
also help restrain the build-up of unsustainable booms and prevent excessive private in-
vestment. In terms of future research, analyzing the allocation of government spending
would be vital for a better understanding of the effectiveness of fiscal interventions during
financial crises, especially in situations where monetary policy is constrained by the zero
lower bound on interest rates.
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